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This paper is concerned with a set of phenomena that lies at the intersection of popular
culture, genetics, cybertechnology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and other advanced
technologies, bio-ethics, science speculation, science  ction, mythology, the New Age
Movement, cults, commerce and globalization. At the centre is a radical technophilia that
 nds representative expression in posthumanism, an Internet-based social movement driven
by an extreme scienti c utopianism. This set of phenomena constitutes an articulated
cultural response to a number of underlying economic, technological and social dynamics
that are together transforming the world, and particularly developed societies as they are
incorporated into a global system of ‘digital capitalism’. This paper  rst describes posthu-
manism and transhumanism. It then explores two key notions, teleportation and cyborgs,
that receive extensive attention in mainstream media and serve as exemplars of this
scientistic ideology, locating them both in cultural history and contemporary popular culture.
The paper argues that posthumanism and associated phenomena are best seen as an
ideological interpellation of humanity into an increasingly dominant scienti c and techno-
logical order based on the cultural and scienti c ascendancy of the ‘Informational
Paradigm’ identi ed by Katherine Hayles in her inquiry into ‘How we became posthu-
man’.
This paper is concerned with a set of phenomena that lies at the intersection of
popular culture, genetics, cybertechnology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and
other advanced technologies, bio-ethics, science speculation, science  ction, myth-
ology, the New Age Movement, cults, commerce and globalization. At the centre is
a radical technophilia that  nds representative expression in posthumanism, an
Internet-based social movement driven by an extreme scienti c utopianism. Posthu-
manism (and its more moderate version, transhumanism) is represented, as we shall
see, by leaders such as Max More, and by such prominent  gures in science,
technology and philosophy as Ray Kurzweil, Kevin Kelly, Peter Sloterdijk and Keith
Ansell Pearson; journals like Wired; self-styled ‘frontier organizations’ like the
Extropy Institute, the Life Extension Foundation, the World Transhumanist Associ-
ation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American Cryonics Society; and by
international events like ‘TransVision MM’, the Third European transhumanist
conference held in London in July 2000. Transhumanism also has a major Internet
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presence and it claims to have discussion groups in every major US city, in Europe
and around the world.
This set of phenomena constitute an articulated cultural response to a number of
underlying economic, technological and social dynamics that are together transform-
ing the world, and particularly developed societies, as they are incorporated into a
global system of ‘digital capitalism’ (Schiller 1999). This paper  rst describes
posthumanism and transhumanism. It then explores two key notions, teleportation
and cyborgs, that receive extensive attention in mainstream media and serve as
exemplars of this scientistic ideology, locating them both in cultural history and
contemporary popular culture. The paper argues that posthumanism and associated
phenomena are best seen as an ideological interpellation of humanity into an
increasingly dominant scienti c and technological order based on the cultural and
scienti c ascendancy of the ‘Informational Paradigm’ identi ed by Katherine Hayles
in her inquiry into ‘How we became posthuman’ (1999).
The concept of ideological interpellation involves the idea that subjects are
constituted through their interpellation into ideology (Althusser 1971: 175); in this
case, the technocratic scientism of posthumanism. Ideology, in turn, may be under-
stood as a systematic representation of people’s imaginary relationship to the real
conditions of their existence. Within the ideology of concern here, human beings
misrecognize themselves as technologically augmented beings, and potentially as
digitized quanta of information ‘living’ within cybernetic systems, and not as
embodied beings living within history and participating in a highly exploitative
economic system. As Althusser (1971: 171–172) initially points out, and as Ricoeur
(1994: 64) emphasizes, the notion of interpellation echoes the idea of the religious
‘calling’: ‘The use of the term “interpellation” is an allusion to the theological
concept of call, of being called by God. In its ability to interpellate subjects, ideology
also constitutes them. To be hailed is to become a subject.’ In a post-Christian social
formation, where ‘God’ can no longer operate as the master-signi er its place can
readily be taken (Zizek 1989: 101), in this case by the emerging conception of a
single, uni ed global information system, and the bene ts previously associated with
religious commitment (salvation, eternal life, etc.) are ascribed to this new omni-
present, omnipotent and omniscient supreme system. As in previous periods of
ascendant capitalism, this ideology has assumed noticeable Social Darwinist tenden-
cies—‘it posits the survival of those with the economic means to  nance their
continued existence’ (Abbas 1999: 1), an existence that the new paradigm projects
into an inde nite future of immortality for the wealthy few. It is the ‘call’ of this
globalized system that posthumanism heeds, as we shall see.
Hayles traces the historical and cultural processes through which the traditional
notion of the embodied human has been replaced by the new ideal of the cybernetic
posthuman, in what Arthur Kroker (1996) has called the ‘ esh-eating 90s’. As
Hayles (1999: 1) puts it: ‘a de ning characteristic of the present cultural moment is
the belief that information can circulate unchanged among different material sub-
strates’, in a state of total independence from the corporeal and material world.
Moreover, under ‘the erasure of embodiment … “intelligence” becomes a property
of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than enaction in the human life-world’
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(Hayles 1999: xi). These notions facilitate the re-conception of human beings as
essentially information that is only contingently embodied and therefore capable of
being ‘uploaded’ into ‘super-intelligent’ communication and information systems
that know no limitations of time or space, as we shall see. Hayles (1999: 16)
identi es three post-war stages in the emergence of the posthuman, each dominated
by a particular constellation of ideas: homeostasis (1945–1960), re exivity (1960–
1985), and the present period of virtuality. She also identi es key players and
representative artefacts from each stage. The people and ideas discussed in the
following well represent the current stage, particularly with the notion of teleporta-
tion—which constitutes the total reduction of human beings to information, to
accomplish ‘the central event of the 20th century … the overthrow of matter’, to
quote Alvin Tof er in ‘A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age’, a manifesto
commissioned by Newt Gingrich (Hayles 1999: 18); and the cyborg—which repre-
sents the obliteration of the boundary between human and machine, with the
machine becoming ascendant in an event conceived as a Promethean leap in
evolution from the human to the posthuman.
***
We turn now to look more closely at the notion of the posthuman. Hassan (1977:
212) observed some time ago that ‘the human form—including human desire and
all its external representations—may be changing radically, and thus must be
re-visioned. We need to understand that  ve hundred years of humanism may be
coming to an end as humanism transforms itself into something that we must
helplessly call post-humanism’. Hassan identi ed this shift with a resurgent
Prometheanism, and this has turned out to be the case, although, as we shall see,
there has been a paucity of philosophical sophistication in posthumanism to match
that of the humanism that has been cast aside, or of the anti-humanism that has
offered a parallel critique. Instead, posthumanism has assumed the dominant
characteristics of a naive brutalism, embracing scienti c speculation, mythic aspir-
ation and capitalist triumphalism in a resolutely non-critical fashion.
The posthuman project has been described as a ‘dubious’ cousin of ‘transhuman-
ism’, which is a slightly more moderate notion that has nevertheless ‘assumed a viral
life, becoming a cultural meme’ (Ansell Pearson 1997: 1–2). It is closely aligned
with the Extropian movement, which sees its (rather daunting) mission as combat-
ing the entropic (i.e. disorderly) tendencies of the universe, especially where these
impact on human well-being and potential. Possibly the most accessible representa-
tive statements in the  eld are: ‘The Transhumanist FAQ’, available from the
Transhumanist Web Alliance (no date; hereafter ‘FAQ’); and the article ‘On
Becoming Posthuman’ by Max More (1994), the leader of the Extropians and a
person whose very name seems an incitement to excess. In its comprehensive FAQ
document, transhumanism is de ned as an extension of humanism that does not
limit itself to traditional humanist methods, such as education, in order to improve
the condition of the human species, a view recently given very controversial ex-
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pression by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, as we shall see (Peacock 2000;
Piper 2000). Instead, posthumanism embraces all scienti c and technological means
available (e.g. arti cial intelligence (AI), molecular nanotechnology, pharmacology)
to move beyond the present stage of human development. This strategy is not in
itself eccentric, as a special edition of Scienti c American on ‘The Bionic Future’
(Fall 1999) makes clear, providing articles on such matters as cloning, growing new
organs, head transplants, the design of new sensory and tactile experiences, the use
of pheromones in stimulating and manipulating sexual desire, the application of
genetic engineering to design babies to order, and the widespread use of arti cial
wombs.
Transhumans are ‘transitional humans’ who are on this path to transcendence,
people who play a ‘bridging role in evolution’ (FAQ: 2). ‘Signs’ of transhumanity
include body augmentation with implants, androgyny, asexual reproduction, and
distributed identity. These people are ‘actively preparing for becoming posthuman’.
A posthuman is a being that has completed this transition. As the FAQ document
explains, a posthuman is ‘a human descendent who has been [technologically]
augmented to such a degree as to be no longer a human’ (FAQ: 2). Posthuman
mental and physical abilities, including intelligence, memory, strength, health and
longevity, would all vastly exceed those of current humans. Posthumans could be
totally synthetic, and AI systems are seen by some as potentially the  rst posthuman
beings. The prospect of living without a body ‘as information patterns on large
super-fast computer networks’ excites great enthusiasm amongst transhumans and
posthumans (FAQ: 4).
More (1994) believes that the posthuman can be achieved via two paths: physi-
cally, through science as we have indicated; and memetically, through the manipu-
lation of cultural memes to effect the radical modi cation of our motivational
structures, involving the transformation and enhanced control of emotions, sexual
orientation, intensity, and frequency. Also prominent is the desire to use genetics,
physiology, neurophysiology, neurochemistry and other sciences to enhance intelli-
gence, to optimize motivational structures, to reduce the effects of illness and aging,
and to radically extend longevity—perhaps even achieving immortality (an area of
considerable commercial potential as the baby-boom generation ages).
The grandeur of this posthuman mission is emphasized when Max More ad-
dresses the question of why ‘we’ would want to posthuman. He cites Nietzsche’s
notion of the Ubermensch, quoting Zarathustra, who reveals that ‘Life’ itself con ded
its secret to him: ‘I am that which must always overcome itself …’. Life, for More,
is negentropic and driven to the creation of ever-higher levels of order. It is also a
grand adventure—the march of the Will-to-Power through history. Humanity is
merely a temporary stage along the evolutionary pathway. Unlimited progression lies
before us and there is no getting off the ride. The future, More concludes, ‘belongs
to posthumanity’. In this fashion, posthumanism locates the logic of technological
inevitability not only in history, nor only in evolution, but also in ‘life’ itself. A more
absolute statement of universalistic determinism is dif cult to imagine.
More’s invocation of Nietzsche leads to another highly prominent example of
posthuman thinking, that provided by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, and
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his recent provocation: ‘Rules for the Human Zoo: An Answer to the Letter on
Humanism’, of Martin Heidegger. First given as a talk in July 1999 to a conference
on the ‘Exodus from Being: Philosophy after Heidegger’, Sloterdijk’s argument was
given prominence in both Die Zeit and Der Spiegel. Within months it had generated
intense controversy, featuring in eight German broadsheets or newsmagazines (twice
as a front-page story) and in numerous television and radio broadcasts (Peacock
2000: 8).
Sloterdijk takes issue with Martin Heidegger’s in uential rejection of humanism
and fear of technology, capitalizing both in an attempt to negate them. Sloterdijk
sees classical humanism as an attempt to ‘improve’ people through the transforming
power of humanist learning—as being, in effect, a central component of the
‘civilizing process’ identi ed by Norbert Elias. This classical humanist project is now
bankrupt, and Sloterdijk puts the question: ‘What can tame humanity when human-
ism fails to ful l this role?’ (Peacock 2000: 7). In response, he argues that the
‘improvement’ of the human species can no longer be restricted to the soft technolo-
gies of education and social engineering. Indeed, the potential of ‘hard sciences’ like
genetic engineering and other forms of biology suggests that the these have inherited
the task of pursuing human perfection, and that the humanist project has therefore
passed to them: ‘Seen in this light, humanist education and genetic engineer-
ing … are closely related: Both are deliberate efforts to improve the nature of
the human species’ (Piper 2000: 74). Sloterdijk argues that we are witnessing the
‘coming era of species-political decisions’, in which the fact must be faced that the
traditional modes of overcoming barbarism, civilizing humanity, and achieving
social change have failed. Given the question as to ‘what will domesticate man when
humanism fails?’, genetic engineering appears not only possible, it becomes necess-
ary! (Piper 2000: 74). Sloterdijk advocates a new  eld of ‘anthropotechnics’, and ‘if
biotechnology means accepting the division of human beings into the genetic
engineers and the genetically engineered, the zookeepers and the animals in the
“human zoo”, well so be it’ (Piper 2000: 74).
Not surprisingly, Sloterdijk’s posthuman vision of the future has activated a deep
dis-ease in German culture that re ects its own Faustian encounter with technology.
His arguments have been attacked as a resurgence of the ‘fascistoid’ (Peacock 2000:
8) desire to achieve a ‘super race’ that produced a murderous contempt for so-called
‘inferior peoples’, involuntary euthanasia and the Holocaust under the Nazis. He has
drawn  re from various quarters including Jurgen Habermas, who was instrumental
early in forcing Martin Heidegger and his followers to face the implications of
Heidegger’s support for Nazism. Indeed, the potential and dangers of such thinking
were foreshadowed by Heidegger’s agonizing about the global reach of technology,
and his turn to Ernst Junger and Nietzsche for insights into this monstrous and
dynamic force that had been unleashed into the modern world. It is clear that
Heidegger made an appalling error in making the political commitment and drawing
the conclusion he did—that Nazism had an ‘inner truth and greatness’ and that it lay
(he later claimed) in ‘the encounter between global technology and modern man’
(Ott 1993: 294). However, the question arises as to whether this error was merely
contingent and one into which Heidegger alone fell? Or does the appearance of
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Sloterdijk’s essay suggest that there is an inherent compulsion to a certain sort of
ideological thinking about technology and its possibilities that projects a totalitarian
realm where phantasies of human perfection, super-races, supreme order, and
perhaps Fuhrers and omnipotent Ubermenschen, can come to reign supreme?
Such a tendency would be consistent with the phenomenon of ‘reactionary
modernism’ identi ed by Herf (1984) as a characteristic response by fascist-inclined
intellectuals to the threat to the present order represented by dynamic new technolo-
gies. As Ansell Pearson remarks of this desire to embrace new technologies while
holding  rm to the orderliness and predictability of the familiar world: ‘The human
fantasy is to devise a technological system so omniscient that it nulli es the power
of the future, transforming the universe into a perfectly administered megamachine
of predictable outputs and calculable energies’ (1997: 152). And as Bozeman points
out in his study of science-based millenarian groups like Christian Science, Cryo-
genicists and posthumanism: ‘Each [have] a curious blend of radical and conserva-
tive elements; while each promised to completely overturn the social order and bring
about a new, more perfect era, this greater perfection was actually the preservation
and magni cation of the existing … present order … the future will be like the
present, only better—with greater personal wealth, longer lives, and better sex’
(1997: 153), for those privileged to enjoy it.
***
The mission statement that Max More offers in his manifesto raises a character-
istic of posthumanism and transhumanism that can be easily overlooked but that
must be recognized and emphasized. This concerns the apparently naive nature of
their utopianism, despite their continual citation in their publications and their FAQ
document of supporting references, many to scienti c or quasi-scienti c publica-
tions. This naivety is not accidental, but rather re ects a desire to portray tentative
or unlikely claims as unproblematic scienti c probabilities or even certainties (Alex-
ander 2000: 179). Also, like all ideologies, posthumanism tends to allow little or no
room for doubt, and does so by putting forward propositions as if they are no more
than common sense or common knowledge. Dissent then appears as mere igno-
rance. Disbelief is suspended and centuries of hard-won experience and intense
critical thinking about science, technology and the social formation within which
they  ourish are swept aside by an uncritical ‘will-to-believe’ propositions about the
possibilities of science and technology that are often preposterous, and even undesir-
able.
This credulity is made all the more ironic by the prominent parts played in the
posthuman project by people who ridicule religious faith in gods, messiahs and
miracles—an irony that is illuminated, however, by the comments offered earlier
about the religious precedent for interpellation in ideological systems. For example,
More’s article on the posthuman appeared in 1994 in Free Inquiry, a journal of the
Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism Inc., in a special issue on the theme
of ‘Playing God’. More dismisses the idea of playing god because he claims he sees
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no way of transcending the laws of physics and has no time for what he sees as the
jealous, vengeful, moralistic god of the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, his
belief in the coming of the posthuman is clearly millenarian. Indeed, More’s article
is analysed in John Bozeman’s (1997) study of ‘Technological Millenarianism in the
United States’, which locates it within the traditional apocalyptic tradition. Bozeman
points out that Extropians even have their own eschatology, centred on the idea that
the world will soon witness an ‘information singularity’, where the trend-line
produced by the exponential growth of information production goes vertical in the
near future, and information presumably  oods the world, causing ‘a fundamental
reordering of both the consciousness of individuals and of the greater society’ (1997:
155). Similarly, the emphasis on technology as the source of salvation also has
religious characteristics. As David F. Noble points out in his study of The Religion
of Technology, even though movements like the Extropians and posthumanism
valorize high standards of rationality, ‘they are driven by distant dreams, spiritual
yearnings for supernatural redemption. However dazzling and daunting their display
of worldly wisdom, their true inspiration lies elsewhere, in a enduring, other-worldly
quest for transcendence and salvation’ (1999: 3). Posthumanism/transhumanism
can therefore be seen as lying in the same American tradition of quasi-scienti c
religious movements as Christian Science and Scientology. Its cultish embrace of
science locates it in the same cultural space as the New Age Movement (Melton
1990) with posthumanism’s individualistic and scientistic appropriation of science
serving as a counterpoint to the earlier collectivist and mystical appropriation of
science carried out by writers like the physicist Fritjof Capra in The Tao of Physics
(1976) and The Turning Point (1983).
One characteristic of posthumanist discourse that is notable for its political naivety
and ideological implications is its frequent use of the inde nite ‘we’ to signify a
‘universal humanity’ that is going to participate in the technological millennium.
This conceit is found in More’s article, which is written in the  rst-person plural,
speaking apparently for humanity in general, but really only for a small minority of
the af uent, technologically-empowered classes of the US or possibly other ‘First
World’ countries. The millions in Africa and elsewhere who are dying from AIDS in
the face of the scienti c failure to develop a cure or even affordable treatment, or
who stagger along legless and maimed from landmine explosions and high-tech civil
wars, might have different views about the power of technology. Far from delivering
a posthuman utopia, science and technology have either failed them in a vital area
or violently stripped them of human powers and potential. More might think this is
an accidental outcome of humanity’s encounter with technology: a more sophisti-
cated analysis of the economic and cultural role of technology suggests that there is
nothing at all accidental about it, as Heidegger feared.
Despite these failings, the speculative use of science and technology to bring
immortality entrances posthumans. Major discussions were held on the topic at
‘Extro 4’, the Fourth Annual Conference of the Extropy Institute at the University
of California, Berkeley in 1999. The discussion was militant and talk was of
the battle that lies ahead with reactionary ‘human naturalists … who think it is
nonhuman to live 200 years’ (Alexander 2000: 179). Death, More (1994: 39)
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declares, is now an unacceptable imposition on human beings and the inde nite
‘we’ are not going to take it anymore! As Ray Kurzweil (1999: x) predicts, at
the end of the century, ‘Life expectancy [will be] no longer a viable term in
relation to intelligent beings’. On the contrary, the relationship of such awe-
some technological capabilities to the appalling quality of life lived by billions in
the here and now of the contemporary world is left aside as uninteresting or
irrelevant.
More (1994) cites the myriad different ways in which chemistry and technology
have already taken us down the posthuman path. He also predicted that the dawn
of the new millennium would see a powerful new Prometheanism. By using
engineered viruses to alter genetic structures and nanotechnology to alter the
structure of matter, we will be able to program the (re)construction of physical
objects, including our bodies. More does not share the recently expressed concern
of leading technologists like Bill Joy, the Chief Scientist at Sun Microsystems. Joy
warns that ‘nanotechnology has clear military and terrorist uses’, and that its use
involves ‘a grave risk—the risk that we might destroy the biosphere on which all life
depends’ (2000: 246). The idea that a nanotechnological plague could be unleashed
seems not to have concerned More. He seems to assume that humanity will always
be able to control this type of technology, and writes as if the ecological crisis and
the rise of environmentalism had never occurred.
More also believes that we will be able to ‘upload’ ourselves from our biological
brains into synthetic brains running on ‘advanced’ hardware. (‘Upload’ is, of course,
a revealing spatial metaphor that places the human brain in a subordinate position
to its ‘superior’ technological creations.) The objective of this ‘upload’ is to attain
superintelligence, which is de ned as an ‘intellect that greatly outperforms the best
human brains in practically every  eld, including scienti c creativity, general wis-
dom and social skills [!]’ (FAQ: 5). Such ‘uploading’ is one of the two ways in which
posthuman/transhumans hope to achieve superintelligence. The other is through
‘gradual augmentation of their biological brains, perhaps using nootropics (“smart
drugs”), cognitive techniques, IT tools (e.g. wearable computers, smart agents,
information  ltering systems, visualization software, etc.) Neurological interfaces
and bionic brain implants’ (FAQ: 6).
Computer-aided superintelligence means, More claims, that our mental processes
will run up to a million times faster than at present. Such predictions are common
in the posthuman and transhuman literature, as we shall see in a moment in
discussing the work of Ray Kurzweil. It is astonishing not only that More and others
think such an acceleration of human thought processes is possible, but that they also
think it necessary or desirable! One is required to ask what vital area of truly human
embodied life—love, desire, caring, empathy, creativity, etc.—could conceivably be
enhanced simply by enabling the brain to process information faster, and why and
how the relevant areas of the brain would require or cope with an acceleration by a
factor of one million? In fact, such an enhancement is not really related to these
affective areas at all, and the enhancement would only make sense if ‘humans’ were
conceived in entirely rationalistic terms, as disembodied, information-processing
network ‘nodes’, linked together in some massive distributed computer system—
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which is of course precisely the posthuman vision of the ‘hive-mind’ (Kelly 1994:
Chapter 2).
The point of such a massive, all-encompassing system is dif cult to discern. Is it
really humanity’s destiny to technologically unify itself into One Big System dedi-
cated to processing gargantuan amounts of information—to be totally disembodied
and indeed to become information? We have already noted how the prospect of living
without a body, ‘as information patterns on large super-fast computer networks’,
excites great enthusiasm amongst posthumanists (FAQ: 4). In a manner that
indicates the religious elements of this ideology, it seems just assumed by posthu-
manism that such an ethereal destiny is clearly a ‘good thing’. In fact, it is possible
to recognize the process identi ed by Wertheim (1999) whereby cyberspace is
assuming the same cultural role previously enjoyed by Heaven—in such a scenario,
the posthuman desire to shed the corporeal and material realm and ‘be at one’ with
everything and everyone via a gigantic information system is a contemporary version
of the Christian goal of Atonement (at-one-ment).
The posthuman faith in computer-enhanced intelligence can also be read politi-
cally as an ideological re-assertion of reactionary models of technocratic rule.
Whereas early nineteenth-century theorists of industrial society like Henri Saint-
Simon or Auguste Comte believed that industrial complexities over-ruled democ-
racy and demanded rule by technical experts and industrialists, the new cybernetic
technocracy demands that political power be stripped from people altogether and
invested in computer systems. Indeed, ‘creating superintelligence is the last inven-
tion that humans will ever need to make, since superintelligences could themselves
take care of further scienti c and technological development’ (FAQ: 6). An excellent
example of this cyber-technocratic tendency is provided by Ray Kurzweil (1999)
with his insistence that we are about to enter ‘the Age of Spiritual Machines’,
characterized by the complete ‘cyborgization’ of humanity, a notion we will further
discuss in the following.
***
We turn now to look in more depth at two examples of posthuman utopianism
that are not only prominent in scienti c research, mainstream media and within
popular culture, but also exemplify the aspirations of the posthuman project—
teleportation and cyborgs.
Posthuman utopianism often seems to occupy a fantasy realm where the world
becomes ‘Legoland’ and the tinkering child becomes a world-creating Prometheus.
In such a realm, the same ‘name it, claim it’ mentality of the ‘Prosperity Gospel’ of
some Christian sects comes into play—anything an aspiring transhuman can think
may be projected into the near future where it is postulated as a looming reality to
be possessed, brought into being by an heroic and virtually omnipotent science. An
excellent example of this wish ful lment—and of its penetration into mainstream
culture—is the cover story of a recent issue of Scienti c American (Zeilinger 2000)
concerning ‘quantum teleportation’, a story echoed in the 20 May 2000 issue of New
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Scientist (Mullins 2000)—a publishing coincidence that perhaps demonstrates the
in uence of scienti c publicists and well-placed press releases.
Teleportation, the standard Star Trek form of transportation from the Starship
Enterprise to a planet’s surface, has become a staple of science  ction and popular
culture: ‘Beam me up Scotty’ is now a ubiquitous tag or cliche, or indeed ‘a cultural
icon for the global informational society’ (Hayles 1999: 2). In terms of real science,
the physics of teleportation involve probably insurmountable problems, being effec-
tively limited to the teleportation of the quantum states of photons (Mullins 2000;
Zeilinger 2000). Indeed, the idea was only introduced into the Star Trek series to
eliminate production costs associated with the continual depiction of space ships
landing and taking-off from strange planets (Zeilinger 2000: 32).
However, despite its implausibility, there is a deeply embedded cultural fascina-
tion with the notion that explains its popularity and in uence in propagating the
Informational Paradigm. If we look into the cultural history of teleportation, we  nd
some notable precursors, like the Christian notion of the ‘rapture’, according to
which believers will be instantaneously transported to Heaven as the Day of
Judgement arrives. Another precursor is the traditional occult notion of astral travel,
which is based on the idea that humans possess an ‘astral body’ (meaning literally
‘starry body’ or ‘body of light’) that is separate from the familiar soul and body. This
is an exact copy of the corporeal body but is immortal and is made of  ner material
that is capable of separating itself from the body and travelling at will upon the astral
plane, through any physical obstacle and across vast distances. This is an idea that
found tragic expression in the recent mass suicide of the ‘Heaven’s Gate’ cult, the
members of which were devoted Star Trek fans and believed they were to be
teleported out of their corrupt physical bodies to a space ship lurking behind the
approaching Hale-Bopp comet (Goh 2000: 36).
The notion of astral travel has its roots in ancient Indian and classical Greek
philosophy, and appears continuously afterwards in the West,  nding expression in
neoplatonism and in Dante’s Purgatorio (Canto 25) where he explains how, after
death, the soul ‘around it beams its own creative power, like to its living form in
shape and size’. In the sixteenth century, Agrippa von Nettesheim wrote of the
spirit’s ‘vacation’ of the body, when it is ‘enabled to transcend its bounds, and as a
light escaped from a lantern to spread over space’ (Stewart 1970: 147).
The Scienti c Revolution quickly made such spiritualist notions of ‘teleportation’
untenable. In her cultural history of Heaven and its transformation into cyberspace,
Wertheim points out that in the medieval cosmology, space was conceived as
non-homogeneous, possessing room for both physical and spiritual realities. How-
ever, the scienti c conception of space maintains that space is homogeneous and
accommodates just one form of reality—the physical reality of space-time—through
which alone travel can take place. No space for the spiritual remains, there is no
‘soul-space’: ‘by unbounding the physical realm, the Christian spiritual realm was
thereby squeezed out of the cosmic system. That excision precipitated in the
Western world a psychological crisis whose effects we are still wrestling with today’
(Wertheim 1999: 152). The re-appearance of teleportation in science  ction and
elsewhere therefore represents an attempt within culture to re-assert the freedom
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from time and space that humans have traditionally aspired to before this epochal
change in human consciousness. It is this yearning that helps promote articles on
teleportation to the status of cover stories in the world’s leading scienti c publica-
tions.
But such status also re ects another deeply embedded cultural tendency to which
the posthuman/transhuman aspiration to teleportation also gives expression—the
worship of speed. This aspect of contemporary society has been highlighted by Paul
Virilio, who links it closely with the imperatives of war. Virilio (1998) has made a
study of the histories of major social and political institutions like the military, and
of key cultural movements that have addressed the implications of technology, such
as Futurism. This reveals that it is the imperatives of modern war and military
technologies, and particularly the need for the maximum mobilization of forces and
maximum speed in all activities, that are the foundational principles of contempor-
ary economics and society. This drive for speed and mobilization permeates culture
and every aspect of life. Indeed, Virilio detects an ‘undeclared war of militarized
technoscience on the civilian population,’ particularly in the present ‘third age of
military weaponry’ based on cybernetics and information technologies (Armitage
1999: 5). The dynamic driving this lies within science itself: ‘science itself has
become pure war, and it no longer needs enemies. It has invented its own goal’
(Virilio & Lotringer 1997: 184). The relentless quest for ever-increasing speed
derived from the logic of war penetrates every aspect of society, including not only
the economy and communications systems, but also culture and the experience of
the self. It is this imperative that also  nds expression in the cultural longing for the
ultimate velocity that is promised through teleportation.
The aforementioned articles in Scienti c American and New Scientist cater for this
longing by their visual and editorial presentation portraying teleportation in terms of
humans being teleported through space in the precise fashion used in Star Trek.
Although they indicate at certain points that the teleportation of humans or even of
simple material objects is effectively impossible (being limited for the foreseeable
future to the teleportation of the quantum state of a photon!), the bulk of the
discussion in the articles, together with the accompanying illustrations (especially
the Scienti c American cover), portrays the issue in terms of human teleportation. In
this fashion, the pretensions and projections of science come to re ect and exploit
deeply embedded cultural myths and longings.
It must be observed in conclusion that this particular notion of ‘teleportation’,
especially when it is applied to human beings, is an excellent example of the
tendency, explored by Hayles, of how contemporary society has become posthuman
by de-corporealizing humanity and presenting the essence of life as disembodied
information.
***
We turn now to cyborgs, as possibly the exemplar of the posthuman project,
in both its individualistic and collectivist modes. The cyborg possesses a rich
56 M. F. Bendle
cultural heritage, which must be reviewed. So many versions of ‘cybernetic organ-
isms’ have appeared in  lm, television and text that it has spawned an extensive
literature of critical analysis and even its own genre of study—‘cyborgology’ (Gray
1995). This study is able to distinguish between various types, including not only the
more familiar machine cyborgs found in  lms like The Terminator (1984) or Robocop
(1987), but also organic cyborgs, with the later being trans-genetic creatures or
deeply ambiguous monsters—as, for example, in the  lm Alien Resurrection (1997),
which explores the transgression of fundamental boundaries including life/death,
human/alien, and mother/child. Even in this short period of a decade or so, it is
possible to detect a shift in the ontology of the cyborg from the physical and
mechanical to the biological and organic—from an entity that is fabricated to an
entity that is grown.
The underlying concept of the cyborg as a synthetic cybernetic–organic creature
appeared in science  ction in the key period shortly after Norbert Weiner invented
the term ‘cybernetic’ to describe the types of self-correcting weapons systems he
had been developing and analyzing during and after World War II. A critical
moment occurred in 1960 when the scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline
published a paper proposing the term ‘cyborg’ be used to describe self-regulating
human-machine systems for use in space travel. These would automatically main-
tain and modify the life-support systems so that astronauts could focus on higher-
level activities during their travels. The focus was on ‘the exogenously extended
organizational complex, functioning as an integrated homeostatic system’, without
the need of continuous conscious control (Clynes & Kline 1995: 30–31). Clynes was
later appalled at the use to which the concept was put in  lms like The Terminator,
rejecting it as ‘a travesty of the real scienti c concept that we had … a mon-
steri cation of something that is a human enlargement of function’ (Gray 1995: 47).
What Clynes misunderstood, it seems, is that it was precisely this notion of mon-
steri cation that people wanted to think about and explore, not ‘exogenously
extended organizational complexes’—although, as we shall see in the following, such
complex systems might be the dominant form that actual cyborgs will take.
Many novels, stories,  lms and television programmes using the theme of the
cyborg have appeared, contributing greatly to the cultural momentum the notion
quickly gathered. A noticeable cultural shift was from the individual cyborg in the
television series The Six-Million Dollar Man (1973–1978), based on the novel Cyborg
by Martin Caidin (1972), to the malevolent collectivist ‘Borg’ of Star Trek: The Next
Generation (1987–1994) whose goal was the absorption of technologically modi ed
humans into an all-encompassing ‘hive-mind’—a popular idea among posthumans.
The popularity of the Borg concept helped the series achieve high ratings
The cyborg is akin to the robot, a concept introduced by the Czech Karel Capek
in his play R.U.R. (1920) and derived from the Czech ‘robota’ or ‘serf labour’. It
refers to mass-produced slaves grown in vats (an idea echoed in Alien Resurrection),
although the term ‘robot’ subsequently became predominantly applied to human-
like machines. Capek’s play was ‘a nightmare vision of the proletariat seen through
middle-class eyes’ in the shadow of the Bolshevik Revolution (Disch 1998: 8). After
the play premiered in the US, the robot quickly came to assume an ideological role,
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representing the ever-present but feared Other (Disch 1998: 10)—the oppressed
workers, the exploited immigrant servants, the alien masses waiting to invade
America, and eventually the neglected housewife—an idea eventually  nding ex-
pression in the novel (Levin 1972) and  lm The Stepford Wives (1974).
Another parallel conception to the cyborg, and one that is closer to Capek’s
original idea of the robot, is that of the android, which began commonly to appear
in science  ction in the 1940s, although the term ‘androides’  rst appeared in
English in 1727 in connection with alchemical attempts to create an arti cial
human, itself an ancient idea associated with the ‘golems’ of Jewish mythology.
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) gave this idea its  rst and most spectacular
expression by combining it with the myth of Prometheus, and it has been wide-
spread ever since.
Unlike the popular conception of machine robots, androids and cyborgs are seen
within popular culture as speci cally combining biological and technological origins
and characteristics, thereby transgressing previously hermetically maintained
boundaries between, for example, culture and nature, living and dead, organism
and machine, real and synthetic. Like all such transgressions, considerable
misgivings and emotions were generated by these conceptions, especially around
questions relating to their danger to human beings, their possession or not of souls,
and their consequent rights to life, freedom and self-determination. Many of
these questions echoed the debates that had surrounded slavery in previous cen-
turies, re ecting the original conception of the ‘robota’ as slave labour, but they
also re ected powerful and pervasive cultural concerns at the implications for
humanity of the technological revolution. The debate somewhat re ected Hayles
analysis of the three stages of the emergence of the posthuman. In the  rst period,
the emphasis was on homeostasis and control. Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of
Robotics, stated in ‘Reason’ (1941), de ned the limits of robotic behaviour in terms
of protecting human beings, a principle that fell victim to Cold War paranoia, as
stories appeared portraying robots as beyond human control and as capable of great
harm. Later, in the period of re exivity, attitudes began to ease and writers explored
the implications for robots themselves of their possessing life-like characteristics,
producing works on ‘robot existentialism’ such as Barrington J. Bayley’s (1974) The
Soul of the Robot and Asimov’s (1976) ‘The Bicentennial Man’. Films like Blade
Runner (1982) and Robocop (1987) explored the meaning, for cyborgs themselves, of
their situation as creatures living on the boundary between the human and the
machine. More recently, as we enter into the period of virtuality, the cyborg has
assumed virtual form in  lms such as The Lawnmower Man (1992) and The Matrix
(1999).
Cyborgs, androids and robots are parallel cultural conceptions that typify the
‘Fourth Discontinuity’ identi ed by Bruce Mazlish (1993) in his history of the
co-evolution of humans and machines. The Fourth Discontinuity follows the Coper-
nican, Darwinian and Freudian revolutions that progressively and violently decen-
tred humanity from the special position it was presumed to hold in the cosmic
scheme of things. Mazlish feels that it is now quite clear that humans and machines
have co-evolved and that humans have never enjoyed a relationship of mastery over
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their technological tools, but rather exist in a complex symbiotic relationship with
them. The concept of the cyborg makes it possible to explore imaginatively import-
ant issues about the nature of life, freedom, self-determination, the relationship of
humanity to technology, and the transgression of  xed boundaries that previously
had been regarded as vital to civilization.
***
With this background, I shall now discuss an example of the cultural conception
of the cyborg as an individual ‘cybernetic-organism’ as it is found in posthumanism.
As we have seen, a primary attraction of posthumanism is its capacity to support
quasi-religious fantasies of omnipotence and self-transcendence. Such longings are
exempli ed by a recent issue of Wired (Warwick 2000) that features a cover article,
‘Cyborg 1.0’, on Kevin Warwick, a Professor of Cybernetics at the University of
Reading, who is using various cybernetic implants to ‘upgrade’ his body and to
transcended human limitations. Warwick’s body is featured prominently on the
cover and pages of the magazine, an editorial decision that itself should be brie y
analysed. What the reader is visually presented with in such images emphasizes the
frailty and weakness of the human body, but also how its  esh and blood must be
penetrated surgically if it is to be transcended, in keeping with Wired’s cover slogan:
‘augment or bust’. Attached to the cover picture is a holograph that reveals, from
certain angles, the subcutaneous cybernetic device whose implantation is meant to
transform Professor Warwick. Simultaneously evoking and brushing aside fears of
infection or nerve damage from such invasive surgery, Warwick (2000: 150) declares
his Prometheanism: ‘I want to know. I believe this desire—this urge to explore—is
intrinsically human. My entire team is venturing into the unknown with me in order
to bring humans and technology together in a way that has never been attempted’.
Professor Warwick’s cybernetic augmentation is intended to allow him better to
control his environment (opening doors, activating equipment, etc.) while also
manipulating his emotions, his senses, his pain threshold and level of sexual arousal.
In Wired, he and his wife are pictured together in bed, with her displaying the site
of the implant surgery on her arm. Together, they will experiment with ‘his-and-hers
implants’ that will test whether feelings of fear or sexual desire can be transmitted
between people. Representing the mind or body as some sort of recording device,
while also foreclosing on novelty and difference, Warwick asks: ‘Could we record
signals at the height of our arousal, then play these back and relive the experience?’
(2000: 150). Dreaming of effortless omnipotence, he foresees a world where people
can control ‘airplanes, locomotives, tractors, machinery, cash registers, bank ac-
counts, spreadsheets, word processing, and intelligent homes … merely by moving a
 nger’. Valorizing ignorance, the episodic attention spans of modern people, and
their increasing dependence on technology, Warwick proposes that people will no
longer have to learn mathematics because they can be directly linked to the Internet
and be able to ‘call up a computer merely by your thought’ to do the calculations
(2000: 150). Evoking thoughts of Kevin Kelly’s (1994: Chapter 2) vision of a
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‘hive-mind’, where individual thinking will be subsumed into distributed systems of
arti cial intelligence, Warwick believes that the next step will be telepathic ‘thought-
to-thought’ communication, which will give humans ‘a chance to hang in there a bit
longer’ before they eventually succumb ‘to a future in which intelligent machines
rule and humans become second-class citizens’ (2000: 151).
Warwick’s error is to literalize a concept—the cyborg—that is essentially mythical
and derives its greatest signi cance from its cultural role, as we have seen. This
mythical status is clearly pointed out in Donna Haraway’s in uential ‘Cyborg
Manifesto’, which she describes as ‘an ironic political myth’. Haraway (1991: 149)
differs from many commentators on the human/machine encounter by recognizing
from the outset that while the cyborg is a hybrid of machine and organism, it is
above all ‘a creature of  ction,’ a mythical  gure in which essential cultural concerns
are explored. For Haraway, ‘by the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time,
we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organ-
ism … the cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material re-
ality … the cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics’ (1991: 150). As Mazlish
points out, the machine and the human are the axes that de ne contemporary
cultural space, and it is within that space that the ideology of posthumanism has
emerged. Unfortunately, Warwick appears oblivious to the centrality of the complex
cultural and ideological role played by the  gure of the cyborg, and assumes instead
that it is merely a technical objective that can be achieved through the surgical
insertion of computer chips under the skin.
***
Warwick gives expression to the posthuman ideology of a cyborg future at the
level of the individual. As I noted earlier, the cyborg was originally conceived
scienti cally as a complex self-regulating human-machine system, as Ray Kurzweil
now also projects it on a macro-scale in his grandiose exercise in futurology, The Age
of Spiritual Machines. In this near future, computers will not only be able to think,
they will actually become smarter than humans and establish a hybrid, cyborg
species as the next evolutionary step, leaving humanity and the notion of individual
as we presently know them behind. As Kurzweil says of his projected world of 2099:
There is no longer any clear distinction between humans and computers.
Most conscious entities do not have a permanent physical presence … The
number of software-based humans vastly exceeds those still using native
neuron-cell-based computation … There is ubiquitous use of neural-
implant technology that provides enormous augmentation of human per-
ceptual and cognitive abilities. Humans who do not utilize such implants are
unable to meaningfully participate in dialogues with those who do. (1999: x;
emphasis added)
Kurzweil believes that there is even a law—the Law of Accelerating Returns—that
guarantees this posthuman outcome. He predicts that:
The next inevitable step is a merger of the technology-inventing species
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with the computational technology it initiated the creation of … All kinds
of practical and ethical issues delay the process, but they cannot stop it.
The Law of Accelerating Returns predicts a complete merger of the species
with the technology it originally created. (Kurzweil 1999: 317)
These ‘practical and ethical issues’ that would be swept aside by this technological
‘law’ would include determining how a democracy—or indeed any political system—
would operate under circumstances where machines are more intelligent than people
(assuming for the purposes of argument that this is possible, a point disputed by
many, including a leading philosopher in this area, John Searle (1999)) and the two
‘species’ have merged. What would constitute ‘citizenship’ in a cyborg democracy/
technocracy? Apparently ‘non-augmented’ humans would be left out, but is super-
intelligence and machine-like strength enough? Or must a ‘citizen’ also have
‘traditional’ human characteristics such as feelings, emotions, empathy, sociability,
the desire to love and be loved, etc.? (Shades of Blade Runner and Terminator, where
it is the machines themselves that must deal re exively with these questions.) Would
it be necessary to build these ‘humanizing’ qualities into cyborgs in order to make
them ‘ t’ citizens? Or would it be decided that ‘ef ciency’ demands that such
characteristics be deleted from ‘citizens’ of the new technocracy? And who—or
what—would decide such an issue? Humans might think that such qualities are
required for citizenship, but perhaps this is just an expression of the limitations of
human intelligence? Perhaps the super-intelligent machines that Kurzweil foresees
will view these ‘human’ qualities as anachronistic limitations on the new cyborg
species and declare them redundant? Who would or could resist the dictates of such
machines in a world where super-intelligence reigns as the supreme value?
***
It is with such misgivings that I must bring this paper to a conclusion. In my
discussion, I have explored various dimensions of the posthuman, identifying it as an
ideological misrecognition of humanity’s relationship to technology. In a manner
that fundamentally inverts this relationship, posthumanism cedes to technology a
determinism over human affairs that it does not, cannot, and should not enjoy. This
rei cation of technology in turn re ects a range of religious and mythological
aspirations and fantasies, and it is the mobilization of these deeply embedded
cultural themes that gives posthumanism its power. It is vital, however, to challenge
such an inversion and rei cation, and to analyse and reveal the real economic and
cultural dynamics that underlie the emergence of posthumanism.
The case of Ray Kurzweil is exemplary here. Despite the extremism of his views,
Kurzweil is not at all on the margins of culture and politics. He is mainstream. His
ideas are given critical consideration by leading philosophers like Searle, and he was
given space for his views in the special edition of Scienti c American on ‘The Bionic
Future’ (Fall 1999). He was also awarded the 1999 National Medal of Technology
by President Clinton for making a ‘lasting contribution to the enhancement of
America’s economic competitiveness and standard of living’ (Scienti c American,
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282 (4) April 2000: 28). Indeed, it is possible to see Kurzweil’s futurism as a
parable—or indeed as an expression of displaced yearnings or repressed fears—
about the dynamics of globalization, because, to a signi cant extent, humanity is
already in a type of posthuman situation. It is posthuman because it has already
conceded control of vital areas of human life to the machines and the systems, albeit
not (yet) to the forms of cyborg super-intelligence linked in a distributed computer
network that Kurzweil envisages, but rather to the supreme super-intelligence of the
computer-empowered global market, the great catalaxy, as the high-priest of neo-
classical economics, Friedrich von Hayek would call it. As the editor of Wired and
leading posthumanist ideologue Kevin Kelly approvingly observes, the preferred
model of interactive arti cial intelligence is a distributed computer system that is ‘an
exact description of a market economy’ (1994: 47).
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